Abbreviated Curriculum Vita
ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT
Assistant Professor (August 2017 - present) -- Rochester Institute of Technology, Department of Philosophy
Visiting Fellow (2016 - 2017) -- Northeastern University, Department of Philosophy and Religion
Visiting Postdoctoral Fellow (Gastdozentin) (April - August 2016) -- Humboldt University, Berlin School of Mind and Brain
James S. McDonnell Postdoctoral Fellow (2014 - 2016) -- Washington University in St. Louis, Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program Lecturer, full-time (2013 - 2014) -- Boston University, Department of Philosophy
EDUCATION
Boston University, Ph.D. (conferred 2014)
Dissertation Title: “Experiment and Bias: The Case of Parsimony in Comparative Cognition”
Advisors: Alisa Bokulich, Colin Allen (Indiana University)
Indiana University, Visiting Scholar (2012)
Supervised by Colin Allen (Indiana University)
University of California at Berkeley, B.A. (conferred 2003)
Major: Philosophy
AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION AND COMPETENCE
AOS: Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Cognitive Science (especially animal cognition), Bioethics
AOC: Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of Mind, Moral and Political Philosophy
PUBLICATIONS
JOURNALS EDITED
Special Issue of the Royal Society’s Interface Focus, titled: “Convergent Minds: The Evolution of Cognitive Complexity in Nature” (co-editors: Nicola S. Clayton, Corina Logan, Russell Powell)
PRESENTATIONS
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Experiment and Bias: The Case of Parsimony in Comparative Cognition
Although parsimony is traditionally viewed as a virtue of scientific hypotheses, I argue that it is problematically embedded in the standard statistical method incomparative cognition and results in a bias toward under-attributing allegedly more complex cognitive ontologies to nonhuman animals. In effect, this value of parsimony sets as the default or “null” hypothesis the non-presence of the more sophisticated cognitive ability or mechanism under investigation. I argue that the role of parsimony in the experimental setting of comparative cognition is deeply problematic, for several reasons. First, the notion of a cognitive hierarchy running from simplest to most complex is difficult to construct both because cognition cannot be easily carved up at the joints and because the notion of “parsimony” is ambiguous. Second, contrary to some intuitions, the parsimony preference is inconsistent with evolutionary expectations. Third, it increases the risk of wrongly attributing the absence of a potentially morally salient cognitive feature to nonhuman animals. I offer strategies for amending the standard statistical methods in comparative cognition in order to guard against an unwarranted under-attribution bias, and I develop an evidence-based strategy for choosing a null hypothesis that is appropriate given the particular experimental context. Finally, I suggest a role for non-epistemic (e.g. ethical) values in our choice and design of statistical models. Taken as a whole, this work demonstrates that various philosophical investigations of scientific practice – from inquiry into the nature of scientific evidence to analysis of the role of values in science – would be greatly enriched by increased attention to experimental methodology, including the choice and interpretation of statistical models.
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Spring 2017
Philosophy of Science (capstone seminar) – Northeastern University
Moral and Social Problems in Health Care (x2) – Northeastern University
Fall 2016
Moral and Social Problems in Health Care (x2) – Northeastern University
Summer 2016
Philosophy of Experiment (graduate seminar) – Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt University
Fall 2016
Introduction to Cognitive Science (x2) – Washington University in St. Louis
Spring 2015
Introduction to Cognitive Science – Washington University in St. Louis
Fall 2014
Introduction to Cognitive Science – Washington University in St. Louis
Spring 2014
Ethics of Healthcare (undergraduate/graduate seminar) – Boston University
Introduction to Ethics (supervised one graduate student teaching fellow) – Boston University
Fall 2013
Medical Ethics (two sections of 100 students each, supervised four graduate student teaching fellows) – Boston University
Introduction to Ethics – Boston University
Summer 2010
Philosophy of Science – Boston University
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS
Philosophy of Science Association; American Philosophical Association; Society for Philosophy and Psychology; Comparative Cognition Society
Assistant Professor (August 2017 - present) -- Rochester Institute of Technology, Department of Philosophy
Visiting Fellow (2016 - 2017) -- Northeastern University, Department of Philosophy and Religion
Visiting Postdoctoral Fellow (Gastdozentin) (April - August 2016) -- Humboldt University, Berlin School of Mind and Brain
James S. McDonnell Postdoctoral Fellow (2014 - 2016) -- Washington University in St. Louis, Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program Lecturer, full-time (2013 - 2014) -- Boston University, Department of Philosophy
EDUCATION
Boston University, Ph.D. (conferred 2014)
Dissertation Title: “Experiment and Bias: The Case of Parsimony in Comparative Cognition”
Advisors: Alisa Bokulich, Colin Allen (Indiana University)
Indiana University, Visiting Scholar (2012)
Supervised by Colin Allen (Indiana University)
University of California at Berkeley, B.A. (conferred 2003)
Major: Philosophy
AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION AND COMPETENCE
AOS: Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Cognitive Science (especially animal cognition), Bioethics
AOC: Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of Mind, Moral and Political Philosophy
PUBLICATIONS
- Mikhalevich, I. forthcoming. “Animal Suicide: What is the question?” Animal Sentience
- Mikhalevich, I. (2017) “Consciousness, Evidence, and Moral Standing: A Reply to Woodruff on Teleost Consciousness" Animal Sentience 13
- Mikhalevich, Irina, Russell Powell, & Corina Logan (2017) "Is behavioural flexibility evidence of cognitive complexity? How evolution can inform comparative cognition" Interface Focus 7: 20160121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsfs.2016.0121
- Powell, R., Mikhalevich, I., Logan, C., & Clayton, N. S. (2017). "Convergent minds: the evolution of cognitive complexity in nature." Interface Focus 7: 20170029 DOI: 10.1098/rsfs.2017.0029
- Mikhalevich, Irina (forthcoming) “Simplicity and cognitive modeling: avoiding old mistakes in new experimental contexts." In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, eds. Kristin Andrews and Jacob Beck.
- Mikhalevich, Irina & Russell Powell (2016) “Sex, lies, and gender” Journal of Medical Ethics doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103380
- Mikhalevich, Irina (2015) “Experiment and animal minds: why statistical choices matter” Philosophy of Science. 82: 1-11
- Meketa*, Irina (2015) “Honor among (the beneficiaries of) thieves.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 18: 385-402
- Meketa*, Irina (2014) “A critique of the principle of cognitive simplicity in comparative cognition” Biology and Philosophy. 29: 731-745
JOURNALS EDITED
Special Issue of the Royal Society’s Interface Focus, titled: “Convergent Minds: The Evolution of Cognitive Complexity in Nature” (co-editors: Nicola S. Clayton, Corina Logan, Russell Powell)
PRESENTATIONS
- “Minds Without Spines: Toward a More Comprehensive Animal Ethics.” Philosophy Speaker Series. Williams College, MA. (upcoming: April 2018)
- “Minds Without Spines: Toward a More Comprehensive Animal Ethics” Cognitive Science Lecture Series. York University. Toronto, CA. (upcoming: February 2018)
- “Minds Without Spines: Toward a More Comprehensive Animal Ethics” Hale Ethics Series, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester NY. October 2017
- “Experimenting and Intervening” Upstate Philosophy of Science Workshop Series, Hobart & William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY. August 2017
- “Is Behavioral Flexibility Evidence of Cognitive Complexity?” Faculty Works-in-Progress Series Northeastern University. January 2017
- “Simplicity in Cognitive Modeling” Colloquium Series for the Adaptive Rationality & Adaptive Behavior and Cognition Groups, Max Planck Institute for Human Development. Berlin, Germany. July 2016
- “No Simplicity Simpliciter” Mind-Brain Lecture Series at the Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt University. Berlin, Germany. July 2016
- “Experimenting and Intervening” Philosophy Colloquium Series at the University if Missouri, St. Louis. March 2016
- “Knowing what they know: reply to Gary Comstock and William Bauer” commentary at the American Philosophical Association, Central Division. March 2016
- “Smart Moves: Is Behavioral Flexibility Evidence of Cognitive Complexity?” Convergent Minds: Investigating the Evolution of Cognitive Complexity in Nature at Boston University. October 2015
- Invited Commentary for Marta Halina’s (University of Cambridge) “Inference and Error in Comparative Psychology: The Case of Mindreading” Minds Online Conference. September, 2015.
- “Experimenting and Intervening” Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference at Macquarie University. July, 2015
- “Behavioral Flexibility as Evidence of Cognitive Complexity: The Argument Behind the Intuition” Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Colloquium at Washington University-St. Louis. March, 2015
- “Behavioral Flexibility as Evidence of Cognitive Complexity: The Argument Behind the Intuition” Saint Louis Area Philosophy of Science Association Conference. March, 2015
- “Experiment and Animal Minds: Why Statistical Choices Matter” Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, November, 2014
- “A Critique of the Principle of Cognitive Simplicity in Comparative Cognition” History and Philosophy of Science Research Group at the University of Cambridge, UK. October, 2014
- “How Parsimony Biases Experimental Design in Comparative Cognition.” Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation Conference 4 (PSX4) hosted by The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, April, 2014
- “A Critique of the Principle of Cognitive Simplicity in Comparative Cognition.” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SSPP). February, 2014
- “A Critique of the Principle of Cognitive Simplicity in Comparative Cognition.” Fourth Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA) at the University of Helsinki. August, 2013 (paper was accepted but I was unable to attend the conference)
- “Constructing the Null Hypothesis: Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Values in Statistical Methods.” Symposium Session at the APA Pacific Division. San Francisco, CA. March, 2013
- “A Critique of the Principle of Cognitive Simplicity in Comparative Cognition.” 39th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology at Brown University. May, 2013 (poster)
- “Coping with Interdisciplinarity in Animal Studies.” Summary Remarks at “Navigating a Multispecies World: A Graduate Student Conference on the Species Turn” at Harvard University. April, 2013
- Invited Commentary for Dan W. Brock’s (Harvard University) “Physician-Assisted Suicide and End-of-Life Issues.” Boston University Institute for Philosophy and Religion 2013–2014 Lecture Series. October, 2013
- “The False Dichotomy Between Experiment and Observation: The Case of Comparative Cognition.” Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation Conference 3 (PSX3) at the University of Colorado. October, 2012
- “The Importance of Attending to the Null Hypothesis in Comparative Psychology: Replacing Occamism with Empirical Information in Statistical Analysis.” Animal Cognition Conference at Ruhr University in Bochum, Germany. June, 2012
- “Sentimentality and Objectivity: Challenging the Ideal of Emotional Detachment in Comparative Cognition.” Minding Animals Conference at Utrecht, Netherlands. July, 2012 (poster)
- “Experiment and Observation in Comparative Cognition.” Indiana University Center for Integrative Study of Animal Behavior. September, 2012
- Invited Commentary for Ronald Sandler’s (Northeastern University) “Climate Change, Ecosystem Management, and Ecological Virtue.” Boston University Karbank Symposium in Environmental Philosophy. April, 2010
- “Irreversible Loss of Personhood: Toward a Viable Model of Human Death.” Graduate Student Presentation Series, Boston University. June, 2008
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Experiment and Bias: The Case of Parsimony in Comparative Cognition
Although parsimony is traditionally viewed as a virtue of scientific hypotheses, I argue that it is problematically embedded in the standard statistical method incomparative cognition and results in a bias toward under-attributing allegedly more complex cognitive ontologies to nonhuman animals. In effect, this value of parsimony sets as the default or “null” hypothesis the non-presence of the more sophisticated cognitive ability or mechanism under investigation. I argue that the role of parsimony in the experimental setting of comparative cognition is deeply problematic, for several reasons. First, the notion of a cognitive hierarchy running from simplest to most complex is difficult to construct both because cognition cannot be easily carved up at the joints and because the notion of “parsimony” is ambiguous. Second, contrary to some intuitions, the parsimony preference is inconsistent with evolutionary expectations. Third, it increases the risk of wrongly attributing the absence of a potentially morally salient cognitive feature to nonhuman animals. I offer strategies for amending the standard statistical methods in comparative cognition in order to guard against an unwarranted under-attribution bias, and I develop an evidence-based strategy for choosing a null hypothesis that is appropriate given the particular experimental context. Finally, I suggest a role for non-epistemic (e.g. ethical) values in our choice and design of statistical models. Taken as a whole, this work demonstrates that various philosophical investigations of scientific practice – from inquiry into the nature of scientific evidence to analysis of the role of values in science – would be greatly enriched by increased attention to experimental methodology, including the choice and interpretation of statistical models.
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Spring 2017
Philosophy of Science (capstone seminar) – Northeastern University
Moral and Social Problems in Health Care (x2) – Northeastern University
Fall 2016
Moral and Social Problems in Health Care (x2) – Northeastern University
Summer 2016
Philosophy of Experiment (graduate seminar) – Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt University
Fall 2016
Introduction to Cognitive Science (x2) – Washington University in St. Louis
Spring 2015
Introduction to Cognitive Science – Washington University in St. Louis
Fall 2014
Introduction to Cognitive Science – Washington University in St. Louis
Spring 2014
Ethics of Healthcare (undergraduate/graduate seminar) – Boston University
Introduction to Ethics (supervised one graduate student teaching fellow) – Boston University
Fall 2013
Medical Ethics (two sections of 100 students each, supervised four graduate student teaching fellows) – Boston University
Introduction to Ethics – Boston University
Summer 2010
Philosophy of Science – Boston University
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS
Philosophy of Science Association; American Philosophical Association; Society for Philosophy and Psychology; Comparative Cognition Society